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HE PERIOD since 1969 has proven to be a dif-
ficult one for monetary and fiscal stabilization authori-
ties. The rate of inflation has been quite resistant to
attack — prices continue to rise rapidly even now,
more than three years after the Government initiated
its battle against inflation. Moreover, the slowing of
aggregate demand in 1970 had only a moderate im-
pact on inflationary pressures, while generating sub-
stantial increases in unemployment. 1-ligh rates of
unemployment have persisted since early 1970.
Much of the basis for the stabilization actions taken
to curb inflation, such as the 1968 tax surcharge and
a concurrent slowing in Government expenditures,
was predicated on a view of aggregate economic be-
havior which evolved from the Great Depression of
the l93Os. This vie~vlargely reflects the “standard”
model of economic activity found in many basic eco-
nomic textbooks, It states that prices and unemploy-
ment are determined fundamentally by the relation
between aggregate demand and the level of full em-
ployment output.
In its simplest form, the standard model indicates
that when the demand for goods and services falls
below the level of potential output, the economic sys-
tem will experience increased unemployment and the
rate of increase of prices will tend to fall. This impli-
cation of the model has been refined into an hypothe-
sis describing a trade-off between unemployment and
the rate of inflation, where reductions in one are
associated with predictable increases in the other —






Since unemployment averaged 5.9 percent of the
labor force in the six-month period ending March
1972, and the implicit GNP price deflator rose at
almost a 4 percent rate over thesame period, despite
the imposition of price-wage controls, something was
apparently amiss with this view of economic behavior.
Clearly, the simultaneous occurrence of both high
rates of unemployment and inflation since 1969 re-
quircs additional explanation. A logical explanation
centers on price expectations, a factor generally neg-
lected by most analysts until very recently
The economic model developed at this Bank has,
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pectations asa factor influencing both prices and un-
employment, This article considers the effect of mar-
ket expectations in the current inflation-unemploy-
ment situation in order to point out the pitfalls con-
nected with this phenomenon in the analysis of
aggregate economic behavior, These pitfalls will be
considered within the context of a fairly standard,
but somewhat simplified, view of aggregate behavior,
For purposes of illustration, this standard model, which
until recently evidenced little concern for expecta-
tions, will be compared with the model of this Bank,
which takes explicit account of price expectations.
The Standard Model
The standard view of aggregate economic behavior
has its origins in the 1930s, a period marked by ex-
ceptionally high rates of unemployment throughout
much of the world and little or no inflation. As a
consequence, the economic theories which evolved
from that period were oriented toward the develop-
ment of ways to generate sufficient demand to achieve
full employment.’
In addition to a concern for sufficient aggregate
demand to insure full employment, the theory as de-
veloped emphasizes the short run, quantities (not
prices), real variables (instead of nominal ones), and
the entire demand structure of the economy as sum-
marized by the following:
~ subordination of prices to employment (or real output)
in the standard model is further reflected at the economic
level by the absence of prices in the diagrammatic “IS-LM”
version of the standard model developed in the late 1930s,
and at the political level by an important Act which seeks
to promote maximum employment, production and pur-
chasing power, but is known as the Employment Act of 1946.
Consumption Demand+ Investment Demand +
Government Demand = Total Demand
I~stab!i,~’hing Si~ffi.c~.:h;ii.i.:Ikmand
The standard view of economic behavior, whether
formalized by dozens of equations or etched on the
back of an envelope in “judgmental” style, has as its
basis consumption demand and investment demand.
It is primarily by affecting consumer and investor
spending plans that the Government attempts to in-
fluence aggregate demand and thereby affect prices
and unemployment.
Consumption — The consumption sector of the
standard model places strong emphasis on income as
a major determinant of consumer demand, The analy-
sis centers on the fact that individuals can either
consume or save a portion of each extra dollar of
income. The more of each extra dollar of income
spent on consumption, the greater the impact on total
spending. The effect of increased consumer spending
is then “multiplied” through the economy from indi-
vidual to individual.
Historical comparisons indicate consumption spend-
ing has not been especially strong in recent years.
Consumer spending relative to disposable income (the
average propensity to consume) declined from an
average of .92 in the 1960-65 period, to .91 in 1966-69
and .89 in 1970-71. The accompanying chart indicates
General Price Index
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that real per capita consumer spending relative to
real per capita disposable income was below a 1960-69
regression line over the past two years. A slowing
in the rate of growth of consumer spending for non-
durable goods and services has occurred since 1969.
Expenditures on durable goods (in real terms) recov-
ered strongly from the 1970 recession in 1971 and
early 1972, but real consumer expenditures on non-
durable goods and services (which comprise the bulk
of consumer spending) have not rebounded. Thus, the
lack of strength in consumer spending, has been
(according to the standard view) a factor contributing
to sluggish aggregate demand in recent times.
If individuals have decreased the proportion of their
income they desire to spend, they must have increased,
it is argued, the share they desire to save. The ratio
MAY 1972
of saving to disposable income rose from an average
of 6 percent in the 1960-69 period to an average of
8.1 percent in 1970 and 1971. A small change in the
ratio entails a change of many billions of dollars into
saving or consumption.
Total private saving (personal saving plus gross
business saving) relative to GNP, increased from an
average of 15.6 percent in 1968 to an average of 16.6
percent in 1971. Saving has also been high throughout
the latest recession-recovery period compared with
the 1960-61 recession-recovery period. The ratio of
total private saving to GNP averaged 15 percent in
1960-61, well below the 1970-71 average of 16.2 per-
cent.
Investment — The rise in saving has been accom-
panied by relatively weak investment, as the so-called
Investment and High-Employment Saving
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“paradox of thrift” suggests :2
An increased desire to consume — which is an-
other way of looking at a decreased desire to save —
is likely to boost business sales and increase invest-
ment. On the other hand, a decreased desire to
consume — i.e., an increase in thriftiness — is likely
to reduce inflationary pressures in times of booming
incomes; but in time of depression, it could make
the depression worse and reduce the amount of
actual net capital formation in the community. High
consumption and high investment are then hand in
hand rather than opposed to each other.5
The chart on the preceding page indicates that a
substantial gap between investment (gross private do-
mestic investment plus net foreign investment) and
high-employment total saving (private plus Govern-
ment) opened over the past three years. Investment
was still almost $45 billion short of the level of saving
estimated to occur if the economy were operating at
full employment in the first quarter of 1972.
Strong residential construction investment over the
past year was accompanied by gains in business fixed
investment which partially offset recent setbacks in
net exports and sluggish inventory accumulation.
Yet, the full employment-saving analysis suggests that
total investment must accelerate if full employment is
to be achieved. The importance of the investment
stimulus has been described by the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers:
But the economy can have high employment only
if actual investment demands of businesses ame
large enough to match the amount that consumers,
businesses and governments wish to save at high
employment incomes. If actual investment falls short
of high-employment saving, total spending will fall
short of high-employment output. Because of in-
sufficient demand, production will be held to some
lower level where a smaller volume of saving does
match the forthcoming investment.4
Fiscal and monetary actions — The typical fiscal
policy response to sluggish consumer and private in-
vestment spending is stepped-up Government spend-
ing and/or tax reductions to increase aggregate de-
inand. Government spending adds directly to total
spending while tax reductions affect consumer spend-
ing by increasing disposable income, and investment
spending by increasing the after-tax return to the
firm,
2The paradox is that while saving is often considered a
virtue for individuals, massive saving by everyone adversely
affects economic activity.
3Paul A. Samuelson, Econoinicsn 8th ed. (New York McGraw-
Hill, 1970), p. 224.
4Econornic Report of the President (January 1966), p. 42.
The Government adopted restrictive policies in
1968 and 1969 to slow inflation, but has since at-
tempted to provide moderate stimulus to the economy
through tax reductions and increased spending, Cut-
backs in Federal defense spending about coincided
with the tax surcharge of mid-1968 to swing the high-
employment budget from a $15.7 billion deficit in
mid-1968 to an $11.9 billion surplus in mid-1969. The
high-employment budget remained in surplus until
1971 (declining unevenly from the large surplus in
mid-1969 to balance in mid-1971). Earlier estimates
of the 1972 budget, reflecting tax reductions and Gov-
ernment spending increases, projected a sizable high-
employment deficit. Over-withholding of tax obliga-
tions, however, has led to the current projection of a
$3.5 billion high-employment surplus in fiscal year
1972 (as estimated by this Bank) and a $4.1 billion
deficit in fiscal year 1973.
The standard view recognizes that Government def-
icits are more effective in stimulating economic ac-
tivity when accompanied by expansionary monetary
actions, and Government surpluses are more effective
in curbing such activity when accompanied by mone-
tary restraint. Monetary actions were restrictive
throughout most of 1969 as stabilization authorities
attempted to curb inflationary pressures. Such actions
became moderately expansive in 1970 and considera-
bly more stimulative the first half of 1971, despite the
fact that prices continued to rise at a rapid rate. Alter
remaining about unchanged from July 1971 to De-
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a 9.3 percent rate from December to April 1972.
Growth of total spending also increased from a 5.3
percent annual rate in third quarter 1971 to a 7.6 per-
cent rate in fourth quarter and an 11.8 percent rate in
first quarter 1972,
Aggregate Dem.aflfl. t:~oteii~tZai. Out:pi.rt.
and Inflation
The ability of the standard model to accurately
project aggregate demand changes into real output
and price changes was seriously overestimated in re-
cent years. The sufficiency of aggregate demand is
usually judged relative to potential output. Typically,
it is presumed that strong aggregate demand relative
to potential output results in low unemployment rates
and considerable inflation, while weak aggregate de-
mand relative to potential output culminates in high
unemployment and near price stability.
Further, prices are normally related to unit labor
costs, which comprise the major portion of business
costs throughout the economy. Unit labor costs, being
the ratio of the average wage rate to output per man-
hour, respond positively to wage increases in excess of
productivity. The unemployment rate enters the pric-
ing process through a presumed negative effect on
wage demands of workers.5
With its historically strong orientation toward em-
ployment considerations, it is not surprising that the
standard model has come closer to capturing changes
in the unemployment rate than changes in prices (see
5
See Michael Evans, Macroeconomic Activity (New York:
Harper and flow, 1969), pp. 263-74.
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Table I) at a time svhen the typical Phillips curve
relation has seemingly gone awry. Weak aggregate
demand since 1969 has had an adverse impact on
unemployment, as the standard model would suggest,
but prices have continued to rise at a rapid rate.
Despite price-wage controls, prices have increased
only slightly less rapidly since August 1971 than be-
fore the three-month “freeze” announced last August
Much of the price slowing recorded during the freeze
itself was reversed in the early months of 1972.
Wholesale prices of all commodities (seasonally ad-
justed) increased at a 3.1 percent rate from August
1971 to April, compared with a 4.7 percent rate from
February 1971 to August; consumer prices (seasonally
adjusted) rose at a 2.8 percent rate from August to
March, compared with a 4.1 percent rate from Feb-
ruary 1971 to August. The implicit GNP deflator, the
broadest measure of average prices, increased at a 3.9
percent rate from third quarter 1971 to first quarter
1972, after rising at a 3.3 percent rate in the preceding
two quarters.
It would appear that the continuation of inflationary
pressures in the face of high rates of unemployment
reflects a possible change in the deternuination of
prices.6 Such a change is quite probably due to an
upward shift in price expectations. Since the standard
model incorporated little or no role for expectations
prior to the recent inflation-recession experience, there
OConditions surrounding the determinatioa of unemployment
also have probably changed over the past few years. See,,
for example, George L. Perry, “Labor Force Structure, Poten-
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has been considerable effort expended to graft ex-
pectations variables somewhere onto the model.
A Model With Expectations
The economic model of the St. Louis Bank, pub-
lished in April 1970, incorporated from the start a
measure of price expectations as an important factor
in the explanation of price changes. Prices and real
output are related directly to total spending changes
rather than indirectly.
peq Reiatiansof the Mad-el
The determination of uneniployrnent is basically
the same as in the standard vie\v of economic be-
havior; that is, unemployment emerges from the rela-
tion between real and potential output. Spending is
determined directly by monetary and fiscal influ-
ences rather than as the result of aggregating
consumption, investment and government spending.
Prices are estimated by a comparison of total spend-
ing to potential output (as with the standard model)
together with a price expectations
variable.7 Thus, monetary and fiscal
actions arid the anticipation of future
price changes are closely associated
with current prices.
This rather small model indicated,
largely because of the price expeeta-.
tions variable, that inflation would
probably continue for some time, even
after the implementation of restrictive
monetary and fiscal actions in 1969,~
The importance of price expectations,
particularly in a period such as the
present, requires further elaboration.
The foundation for price expectations
is essentially microeeonomie, resting on
the individual decisions of workers and
firms. Since the reasons for individual
decisions are quite difficult to quantify,
the following scenario of recent eco-
nomic behavior is but one possible ex-
planation of the events leading to the
current high unemployment and infla-
tion dilemma,
It atatUIfl-S
The importance of expectations
csnergcs most clearly when viewed
against a background of accelerating
price increases. The late 1960s were
by rising interest rates, rising unit labor
costs, rising rental costs, rising commodity prices, low
rates of unemployment, sluggish productivity and lack-
luster profits. These are traits typically observed near
the peak of a business cycle. The expansionary phase
of this cycle was, however, the longest in the post-War
period. Thus, these cyclical traits at the end of the
expansion of the l96Os were exceptionally strong.
The marked changes in the growth patterns of most
of these indicators began in 1965 when Government
defense and domestic spending demands expanded on
top of strong private demands for a limited supply of
goods and services. Much of the increased Govern-
ment spending xvas accomplished through monetary
expansion rather than through public purchases of
7See Ronald L. Teigen, “A Critical Look at Monetarist
Economics,” and Robert H. Rasche, “Comments on a Man-
etarist Approach to Demand Management,” this Review
(January 1972) for appraisals of recent contributions to the
price expectations literature.
8
See Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carlson, “A Mone-
tarist Model for Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April
1970), p. 20.
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Treasury bonds or tax increases. The money stock,
which had increased at a 3 percent annual rate from
1960 to 1965, rose at a 5.1 percent rate from 1965 to
1968.
Increased demnand could only be met by the addi-
tional employment of relatively inefficient capital and
labor; the more efficient productive factors were al—
rc-ady being utilized. Growth of output per man—Imour,
which had increased at a 4.1 percent annual rate fromn
1960 to late 1965, began to slow almost immediately,
averaging 3.1 percent from third quarter 1965 to third
quarter 1966. From 1966 to third quarter 1969, labor
productivity increased at a 1.9 percent annual rate.
Since profits had been strong until the period of rapid
demnand acceleration, firms were able to employ these
additional capital and labor inputs so long as they be-
lieved the higher costs could he passed along in the
form of higher prices.
Firms apparently expected their own prosperity to
continue for some time and they were not especially
concerned at first tlmat accelerated wage increases and
a slowing growth of productivity, due in large part
to the utilization of inefficient resources, pushed up
unit labor costs. The firms were able to raise their
own prices since aggregate demand was continually
stimnulated until late 1968, but the price increases they
were able to get were not sufficient to cover all of
the rising costs of production. Average prices of goods
and services produced in the private portion of the
economy rose 2.9 percent from late 1965 to late 1967,
slightly more than double the rate of increase from
1960 to 1965. Fromn 1966 to late 1969 these prices rose
at a 3,8 percent annual rate. Unit labor costs, which
had increased at an annual rate of 0.4 percent from
1960 to 1965, rose 4.4 percent in the next year, and at
a 5.1 percent rate from 1966 to late 1969. The accelera-
tion of costs in excess of price increases, adversely af-
fected profit rates throughout the late 1960s.
\Vith the restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
which began in 1968, the rate of growth of aggregate
demand started to fall. At first, firms did not know
whether the cutback in demand for their products
was random, temporary, or of a longer duration. Since
the tendency of most economic units probably is to
extrapolate the experience of recent years into the
near future, the firms’ immediate response to the
slowing in demand was to alloxv inventories to pile
up in anticipation of a later run-off with the resump-
tion of normal demand.
As demand continued to slow, flrmns were faced
with the choice of reducing prices, output, or both.
Costs of production continued to rise rapidly. Unit
labor costs, for example, rose at a 5.5 percent rate from
late 1969 to late 1970, reflecting a 7.5 percent increase
in compensation per man-hour and a 1.8 percent in-
crease in output per man-hour, Thus, reducing prices
and maintaining the same level of output could well
result in substantially larger declines in profit rates.
Output could, however, be slowed at first with less
cost simply by eliminating overtime; that is, output
could change without initially affecting employment.
As the slowing in demand persisted, it became nec-
essary to take stronger steps to eliminate the rising in-
ventory levels. Again firms were faced with the choice
of changing prices or output. Since prices of most
productive factors are established for long periods, it
is often less costly to reduce employmuent than factor
prices. For example, \vage contracts are often negoti-
ated for a three-year period, so that wages of the
working employees are set; interest payments on cap-
ital equipniermt and other loans are set for years in
advance; rent contracts are also negotiated for more
than a short period. Thus it is easier to release workers
normally the least productive ones first — than it is
to get them to take pay cuts. The minimum wage law
is another obstacle to lowering wages, thereby en-
couraging the reduction of employment.
Firms will still be reluctant to release employees,
at first, however, since there is a cost to hiring and
retraining workers later, after demand picks up. Con-
sequently, firms’ decisions to release employees do
not begin with the initial slowing in demand, but only
after it becomes apparent that the slowing is more
tlman temporary. Because of downward wage rigidities
and a lack of knowledge on the part of the workers
that the slowing in demand is pervasive,0 employmnent
normally falls before prices’ are reduced. Workers de-
mand higher \vages, in anticipation of continually
rising commodity prices and because they believe (in-
correctly, in the case of many of the less productive
workers) they can obtain employment elsewhere, if
necessary.
Eventually wage and other contracts are re-nego-
tiated, and at that timne, the prices of productive
factors can be brought into line with the lower level
of demand. A reduction in factor costs makes it pos-
sible for firms to lower prices, as does the increase in
productivity which should occur with the decision not
0See Roger W. Spencer, “High Employment Without Infla-
tion: On the Attainment of Admirable Goals,” this Eeview
(September 1971). There are significant costs of acquiring
information to both firms and workers.
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to utilize the least efficient labor and capital re-
sources. If firms expect their own costs (~vages,rent,
interest payments, raw resource costs) to continue ris-
ing, they will attempt to continue increasing time prices
of their own products to cover costs. At the aggregate
level, they can be successful in permanently boosting
prices if output is reduced or aggregate demand is re-
stimulated by monetary and fiscal actions.
The initial acceleration in the rate of price increase
was begun by stimulative monetary and fiscal actions,
and the initial slowing in aggregate demand followed
restrictive policy actions. The rate of increase in
prices peaked and began decelerating sometime later.
Firms and workers’ decisions, then, in establishing
price, \vage, and employment patterns are closely re-
lated to stabilization actions, although the lag patterns
often differ.
Expectations are important in this view of economic
behavior because: (1) firms do not know what to
expect from the initial fall in demand; (2) after it
is established that the fall in demand is more than
temnporary, workers do not know what to expect in
the svay of demand for their services when they are
asked to leave (or invited to take a wage cut);
(3) firms do not know throughout the process what
to expect in termns of costs of releasing and eventually
re-hiring employees and re-negotiating new factor
price contracts, the eventual strength of demand after
the fall, and the costs of carrying excessive inventories
over the entire period. However, if firms expect their
O\vn costs to continue to rise, they may attempt
to increase prices despite widespread current
unemployment.
TIus scenario of events in the late 1960s can only
suggest the complexity of the element of expectations
and the difficulty of capturing such an element in an
economic model. The St. Louis model attempts to
aggregate price expectations of all workers and firms
by relating current prices to a weighted average of
past prices. This relation indicates that under “normal
conditions,” the prices of one to two years ago have
the strongest impact on current price anticipations.
The imposition of price-wage controls is, among
other things, an attempt to alter the normal pattern
of price anticipations. The initial success of last fall’s
“freeze” in altering price anticipations through curbs
on actual prices may have been lost by the sharp rise
in prices during the first quarter of 1972.
Summary
Two basic models of economic activity are described
in this article. The standard model historically has em-
phasized the spending components of aggregate de-
mand and employment while the St. Louis model
stresses the relation between policy actions and total
spending, and the division of total spending into real
output and prices.
The standard model can explain time existence of
sluggish demand and high unemployment the past
t\vo years, hut has had limited success in projecting
price increases. The St. Louis mnodel, which utilizes
price expectations directly in its determination of
actual prices, has been more accurate in projecting
continued inffation over the 1969-71 period.
Both models projected stronger economic activity
in 1972 than in 1970 or 1971, and GNP data for the
first quarter of 1972 suggest this will be the case.1°
Prices, however, have risen at a rather rapid pace in
recent months despite price-wage control measures.
The St. Louis model indicates that unless expecta-
tions of higher prices can be curbed, inflation will
not soon dissipate. If prices are allowed to subside
gradually through moderate gains in total spending,
price expectations will fall with or without the shock
treatment of controls.
ittSee “The Economy in 1972,” this Review (February 1972)
for a comparison of the projections of the St. Louis model
and other 1972 forecasts.
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